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INTRODUCTION 
Immigration has become one of the most controversial political issues in Europe. Due to 
the current geopolitical situation, as well as demographic realities, the influx of 
migrants to the EU has constantly increased. According to the International 
Organization for Migration, more than a million migrants, including refugees, arrived in 
Europe by land and sea in 2015 (Migration Flows – Europe, 2016). The current 
migration crisis has also deepened the East-West rift. Eastern Europe, due to a different 
historical, political and economic background, has just recently started to develop a 
political cleavage concerning immigration issues, and so far it has caused serious 
tension.  
The considerable electoral success of anti-immigration parties in various European 
countries shows that substantial numbers of citizens perceive immigration as having 
negative consequences, which leads them to prefer a more restrictive immigration 
policy (Spanje, 2011; „The march of...“, 2015; „The growth of the far-right...“, 2016). 
Polyakova (2015) demonstrates that immigration has a significant positive effect on 
support for radical right parties. In the broadest sense, radical right parties across 
Western and Eastern Europe combine a firm nationalist ideology with resentment aimed 
at immigrant or minority populations. What we are now witnessing is that while the 
European Union insists on a unified strategy for dealing with migration issues, national 
governments feel threatened by anti-immigration forces and, are reluctant to go against 
the wishes of their own people, resorting to policies based on their national loyalties not 
on the solidarity in the EU. 
Therefore, immigration is a domain in which public opinion places significant 
constraints on public officials. A failure to agree on an action plan for tackling mass 
immigration to the EU has caused serious discord among EU member states, which is 
undermining the stability and solidarity of European Union. The relevance of public 
opinion thus dictates the need to further examine the individual-level factors that 
influence attitudes towards immigration.   
The objective of this thesis is to identify individual-level correlates of people’s attitudes 
towards immigration and to assess their effects comparatively in Eastern and Western 
Europe. The study examines how socio-economic status, satisfaction with politics and 
belonging to a religion or denomination affects attitudes towards immigration and 
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investigates whether these individual level determinants vary between Western and 
Eastern European countries. Moreover, it evaluates whether the share of foreign-born 
population in the country has a positive or negative effect on people’s attitudes towards 
immigration. By enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of public opinion on 
immigration, the study helps build an empirical basis for a proactive, managed 
immigration policy in Europe.  
This aim will be achieved by using quantitative research methods to analyze individual-
level survey data from a large-n cross-national survey covering 15 countries and 27000 
respondents. Additionally, macro-level data from Eurostat will be used. In order to 
establish whether attitudes towards immigration are shaped by the same factors in 
Eastern and Western Europe, I will run the regression separately for the two groups of 
countries. The research will show whether the overall attitudes in Western Europe are 
more positive than in Eastern Europe and moreover, whether the same individual- level 
predictors influence people’s attitudes the same way in both of these regions.  
Although the effects of various individual-level determinants on immigration have been 
researched before (Facchini et al. 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Sides and Citrin 
2007; Paas and Halapuu 2012), a new study with fresh data is necessary in order to map 
the latest  trends and ascertain relationships between the key variables. Since this thesis  
also investigates how these factors might have a different impact in Western and 
Eastern Europe, it  helps the policymakers to better understand the cleavage within 
Europe which hopefully contributes to an improved, informed, policy making process. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The first part outlines the theoretical 
framework underlying research on public attitudes towards immigration and develops a 
set of hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical section of this study. These focus 
on various factors such as socioeconomic status, political efficacy, belonging to a 
religion or denomination, and the effect of foreign-born population in the country. The 
second part focuses on the empirical analysis. It will explain the data and methods used 
in this study, as well as the operationalisation of the main variables. Then it turns to 
simple descriptive statistics, before presenting the results and discussion of the 
regression analysis. The third and the final section summarises the main results and 
elaborates on the findings. 
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1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION AND THEIR 
DETERMINANTS 
There is a wide array of literature available on the factors that influence individuals’ 
attitudes towards immigration. This thesis focuses on three sets of individual level 
variables: socioeconomic status, political attitude and belonging to a religion or 
denomination. Also, it plans to evaluate the effect that foreign-born population has on 
attitudes towards immigration, and, in addition, it is concerned with the question of 
whether or not attitudes towards immigration are shaped by the same factors, and 
whether these factors have similar effects in Western and Eastern Europe. What follows 
is a brief overview of existing literature on previously mentioned topics that, with the 
help of recent studies, help pose a series of hypotheses for this paper.  
1.1 Socioeconomic status 
Two measures of socioeconomic status are selected: education and personal assessment 
of one’s economic condition. Using the 1995 and 2003 rounds of the International 
Social Survey Program, Facchini et al. (2008), find that education has a significant and 
positive effect on pro-migration attitudes. Using data from European Social Survey 
2003, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) lend additional support to previous results by 
stating that higher education leads to higher support for all types of immigrants, 
explaining that this outcome is linked to cultural beliefs. Better educated respondents 
are significantly less racist because they believe cultural diversity benefits the host 
country, and its economy as a whole. Also, because gaining knowledge leads to 
exposure to a variety of experiences, it is more likely that these individuals develop 
broader empathetic capabilities (Rustenbach, 2010:67). Another theory links education 
to economic self-interest, saying that higher levels of education leads to improved skills 
and higher qualifications, which lowers the possible competition from immigrants in the 
labour market (Mayda, 2006). As a result, an individual feels a sense of greater 
economic security and is therefore more likely to be tolerant towards immigrants.  
Feeling economically secure is an important factor in having a more positive attitude 
towards immigration. Various researchers, such as Polyakova (2015) and Sides and 
Citrin (2007), have discovered that the actual economic situation of a country does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with attitudes towards immigration or with 
increased support towards radical-wing parties. However, personal economic situation 
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seems to have an effect on anti-immigration sentiments. Facchini et al. (2008), find that 
income has a positive and significant effect on pro-migration attitudes. Likewise, Sides 
and Citrin (2007), using European Social Survey 2002-2003 data, find that personal 
economic concerns have a significant effect on attitudes towards immigration. Paas and 
Halapuu (2012) also suggest that lower socioeconomic risks and therefore more positive 
expectations towards the future result in more tolerant attitudes. All in all, people who 
are anxious about their economic well-being tend to be less trusting towards 
newcomers. Hence the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1. A higher socioeconomic status is associated with a more positive attitude towards 
immigration. 
1.2 Political trust and sense of efficacy 
Political trust and a sense of efficacy have also been linked to anti-immigration 
tendencies. Political efficacy „indicates citizens’ personal confidence in and perceived 
influence that they have on government and political affairs“ (Hu, Rong; Sun, Ivan Y; 
Wu, Yuning, 2015:1013). It is a measure of internal beliefs about one’s capabilities to 
engage in the political process and the external confidence that the person has in the 
responsiveness of the government. Polyakova (2015), using World Values and 
European Values Surveys from 1990-2008, finds that lower political participation and 
trust slightly increases support for the radical right. Paas and Halapuu (2012) have 
discovered that those who trust their national institutions and politicians are more 
tolerant towards immigrants, explaining that people trust their institutions to keep them 
safe from the possible threats immigration might represent (2012:169). Espenshade and 
Hempstead (1996) write that people who are politically alienated are generally more 
negative towards immigrants. Politically alienated people often seek to place the 
responsibility of their problems elsewhere, blaming politicians and immigrants. A 
transparent and reliable political system, where people feel included and capable, might 
help to increase positive attitudes towards immigrants. Citizens who trust their 
government are more inclined to support government proposals and decisions, and 
politicians have a greater room to manuever when it comes to difficult and urgent tasks 
such as the migration crisis. For this reason, the following hypothesis is posed: 
H2. A higher sense of political efficacy and political trust is associated with a more 
positive attitude towards immigration.  
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1.3 Belonging to a religion or denomination 
The final individual-level factor that has received considerable attention in current 
research is belonging to a religion or denomination. While some stress the positive 
effect of religiosity on attitudes towards immigrants (Knoll, 2009; Bohman and Hjerm, 
2014), others find it to be associated with wider support for anti-immigration policies 
and broader prejudices (Bloom, Arikan, Courtemanche, 2015; Scheepers, Gijsberts, 
Hello, 2002). Scholars are divided about how to interpret these findings. Because 
religious groups compete for many of the same resources, they are likely to perceive 
groups with other convictions as threatening. Conflict could arise over differences in 
general core values. On the other hand, religious belief can be associated with values 
like solidarity, altruism and religious compassion. Interestingly, research by Hall, Matz 
and Wood (2010) about meta-study of religiosity and prejudice, found that the 
relationship between religiosity and prejudice has been steadily declining over time. 
Bohman and Hjerm (2014:948) also stress that the situation in Europe and the meanings 
of religion are changing since correlation between religiosity and anti-immigration 
attitudes has been somewhat declining between the ESS rounds. It would be interesting 
to see, whether the relationship between religiosity and pro-immigration attitudes is 
positive. Subsequently, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis: 
H3. Individuals who belong to a particular religion or denomination are more likely to 
have a positive attitude towards immigration than people who do not belong to any 
particular religion or denomination.  
1.4 Foreign-born population in the country 
Race and ethnicity scholars have wrestled for decades with the question whether 
interracial/interethnic closeness produces hostility or harmony. Jeffrey C. Dixon (2006) 
states that there are two main theories reqarding this question – group threat theory and 
contact theory.  
According to group threat theory, a substantial minority population living close to the 
dominant group leads to economic and/or political threat and ultimately prejudice by the 
dominant group (Blalock, Hubert M Jr, 1967). Benjamin J. Newman, Todd K. Hartman 
and Charles S. Taber (2012) find that when the ethnic minority does not share the same 
language with the dominant group it also increases a sense of cultural threat, which in 
turn, increases support for restricting immigration levels or moreover, translates into a 
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desire to completely remove the group from society. However, it is important to note 
that most of the pro-group threat studies have been conducted in the U.S (Wagner, 
Ulrich et al., 2006:381). The lenghty historical development of anti-African American 
hostility may be much harder to break down with contact strategies when compared to 
the history of minority groups in Europe. The inhumane horrors closely felt in Europe 
during World War II paved a fertile foundationfor powerful human rights ideas with a 
different understanding towards minorities than it was the case in the U.S.  
Therefore it might be more applicable to turn to contact theory which states that a 
sizable minority population, living near the dominant group, may represent 
opportunities for contact between the minority and the dominant group which might 
help develop positive views of minority groups (Sigelman Lee et al, 1996). Thomas F. 
Pettigrew (1998), using several European samples, also indicates that although the 
deeply prejudiced avoid intergroup contact and resist the positive results, contact has 
some effect on the reduction of prejudice. Lauren M. McLaren (2003:927), using the 
Eurobarometer survey from spring 1997, finds that contact does have a significant effect 
on attitudes toward immigrants in the European context through mediating the effect of 
threatening environments, helping to produce lower levels of threat perception in 
contexts of high immigration. John Sides and Jack Citrin (2007:496) found that 
countries with large immigrant populations are not especially likely to oppose 
immigration but are even slightly more positive towards it. All in all, increased contact 
with others could lead to enhanced intercultural understanding, which would help not 
only reduce bias but also see others in personalised ways. Ergo, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: A higher percentage of foreign-born population in the country is associated with a 
more positive attitude towards immigration. 
1.5 Eastern Europe versus Western Europe 
The last aspect of current research derives from the reality that mass immigration is a 
much newer phenomenon in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Hansen (2003) 
writes that after the Second World War, due to a new demand for labour that could not 
any longer be satisfied domestically, Western European countries started to seek out 
labour migrants. With their economies slowing, all countries ended their primary 
migration in the beginning of 1970s, however that did not bring immigration to a halt. 
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Since the labour migrants were granted citizenship, they demanded unification with 
their families. The third step in the migration chain came with asylum seekers whose 
numbers started to rise in the 1980s and exploded in 1989. The result of these migration 
flows was a multicultural Europe. Eastern Europe, due to different historic background, 
has not had similar experiences with their Western neighbours. And in general, most 
Central and Eastern European countries have a very low percentage of pro-migration 
voters (Facchini et al., 2008:664). Therefore, it could be expected that the different 
compositions of immigrant populations, different historic backgrounds and varied 
political and economic developments produce differences in attitudes towards 
immigration, and, possibly, a more positive attitude towards immigration in Western 
Europe compared to its Eastern Europe.  
Accordingly, present research proposes the following hypotheses: 
H5a. People living in Western Europe have a more positive attitude towards 
immigration compared to people living in Eastern Europe. 
H5b. The individual-level predictors of attitudes towards immigration are the same in 
Eastern and Western Europe. 
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2. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
2.1 Data and methods 
The analysis is based on the European Social Survey Round 7 first edition database 
(ESS Round 7, 2014). The first edition includes data from 15 of the 22 countries in 
Round 7: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland. 
The fieldwork was mostly carried out between the time period of September 2014 to 
May 2015. However, in Hungary the interviews took place between April and June of 
2015 and in Poland, between April and September of 2015. Estonia, the first one to 
finish, wrapped up the interviews in December 2014, while in Poland, field research 
was completed only in September 2015. That is a nine-month long difference in 
recording the answers, an important factor because the migration crisis started in 2015 
and gained power all throughout the year. Thus we could possibly expect more negative 
attitudes in Poland than in Estonia.  
The data consists of the answers of up to 27,000 respondents to an hour-long 
questionnaire, with an average country sample of about 1800 respondents. The 
European Social Survey is an academically driven cross-national survey that seeks to 
chart stability and change in social structure and attitudes in Europe since 2001. ESS 
features large nationally representative samples that provide a significant cross-national 
variation in economic, social and political contexts. The questionnaire contains a large 
range of socioeconomic and demographic questions and several rotating, topic-specific 
modules, one of which focuses on the issue of immigration. In addition to ESS survey 
data, Eurostat data of foreign-born population by country of birth – measured in 
percentage of of total population – is used to evaluate the effect that foreign-born 
population has on attitudes towards immigration (Eurostat, 2014).  
The proposed research is based on quantitative techniques. Regression analysis is used 
to explore the relationships between individual-level predictors and foreign-born 
population in the country (independent variables) and attitudes towards immigration 
(dependent variable). In addition, an identical regression analysis will be conducted 
separately for Western and Eastern European countries, in order to find possible 
similarities or differences when comparing regression coefficents.  
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2.2 Operationalisation of variables 
To measure attitudes towards immigration, the questions posed by the European Social 
Survey are used. ESS questionaire included a series of scales about attitudes towards 
immigration referring to different areas of a country's life like economy, crime and 
culture. It would have been possible to use those area-specific questions to produce an 
index, but instead of that, one general question as a measurement of attitudes towards 
immigration was chosen. This was done because an index would give an equal weight 
to those area-specific immigration questions, not considering the fact that even when a 
person feels negative about one specific topic, for example crime, it does not necessarily 
mean that their general view of immigration is also negative. It is hard to grasp the 
different weights of specific questions and therefore a more general question appears to 
be more valid and suits this study better. Thus, the dependent variable – attitudes 
towards immigration – was measured by the following question: „Is country made a 
worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?“. The 
response categories ranged on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicated a belief that 
immigration makes the country a „worse place to live“ and 10 indicated the conviction 
that immigration would make the country a „better place to live“. Although we do not 
know exactly how stable these answers are, similar scale questions have also been used 
in previous studies (Sides and Citrin 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Paas and 
Halapuu 2012).  
The independent variables of the current study are based on four different topics – 
socioeconomic status, political trust and efficacy, belonging to a religion or 
denomination and foreign-born population in the country. First, to measure the effect of 
socioeconomic status on attitudes towards immigration two independent variables are 
used: education and personal assessment of one’s economic condition. The education 
variable was measured by number of years of education, whether full-time or part-time, 
completed by the respondent. To measure one’s personal economic assessment the 
following question was used: „Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to 
how you feel about your household’s income nowadays?“. Respondents were given 
these options: 1 – living comfortably, 2 – coping, 3 – finding it difficult and 4 – finding 
it very difficult. Since the answers were unevenly distributed, having 81% of the 
responses in the first two categories, two new dichotomous variables were created: very 
good economic assessment, based on the first answer, and poor economic assessment, 
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based on the third and fourth answer combined. Answer number two – coping with the 
present economic situation remained the reference category. The few "don't know" and 
missing answers were excluded from the sample. 
Second, political trust and sense of efficacy is measured by three different independent 
variables. The study uses two following questions posed in the survey: „How much 
would you say that the political system in [country] allows people like you to have an 
influence on politics?“ and „How much would you say that politicians care what people 
like you think?“. Both of these questions were recorded on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
the endpoint 0 indicated a negative outcome „not at all“ and 10 indicated a positive 
outcome „completely“. The study also asks how satisfaction with the government 
influences the attitudes towards immigration and uses the following question: „Now 
thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing 
its job?“, where the answers ranged from 0 to 10, 0 being extremely dissatisfied with 
government’s performance and 10 being extremely satisfied with government’s 
performance. Missing and „don’t know“ answers are excluded from the sample.  
Third, belonging to a religion or denomination is measured by using a ESS question 
where respondents were asked whether they consider themselves as belonging to any 
particular religion or denomination. It is a dichotomous ’yes’ or ’no’ question. Again, 
missing and don’t know cases are excluded. Lastly, to measure the effect of foreign-
born population in the country, independent variable of foreign-born population – 
measured in percentage out of total population – is also added. This variable is 
measured using data from the Eurostat. 
In order to find out whether there is a cleavage in Europe, the study has to divide the 
countries into two categories: Eastern and Western Europe. Eastern Europe will be used 
as a synonym to Eastern Bloc, which was the name used for the former communist 
states of Central and Eastern Europe, generally the Soviet Union and the countries of 
the Warsaw Pact (Satyendra, Kush, 2003:65). Thus, Eastern European countries in 
current research are Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Western European 
countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Although Germany was 
divided and experienced both sides of the Iron Curtain, the Federal Republic of 
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Germany was considerably larger, both territory and population wise, and therefore 
Germany is identified as a Western European country.  
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. As 
previously mentioned, the dependent variable, attitude towards immigration, is 
measured on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 meaning a negative attitude towards immigration 
and 10 meaning a positive attitude towards immigration). Graph 1 shows that the means 
of attitudes towards immigration range between 3.9 and 6.7. The residents of the Czech 
Republic appeared to harbour the most doubts about immigration, with an average score 
of only 3.9 out of 10. The most positive attitude is found in Sweden – a country that has 
had liberal immigration policies for decades – where the mean is 6.7 points out of 10.  
When comparing the means in Eastern and Western Europe the latter has somewhat 
more positive attitudes towards immigration, as predicted. The mean in Western 
European countries is 5.3 while in Eastern Europe it is 4.6 points out of 10. Graph 1 
provides a visual outcome of the same results having Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Estonia – with a lower mean than the European average of 5.1 – all at the bottom half of 
the graph.  
Graph 1. Means of attitudes towards immigration by country 
 
Note: Measured on 10 point scale (0 – negative attitude towards immigration; 10 – 
positive attitude towards immigration). 
3.9 4.3
4.5 4.8 4.8 4.8
5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.7
6.7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 12 
 
Poland, as another Eastern European country, stands out in this sense, sharing the third 
most positive attitude with Finland and Norway with a mean of 5.5 points out of 10. It 
could have been assumed that Poland has a more negative attitude towards immigration 
because Poland finished the survey interviews in September 2015, when the migration 
crisis was already in full scale. Although Estonia wrapped up the interviews first 
(December 2014) out of all the countries under review, it has a more negative attitude 
than Poland. Other than Poland, other countries carried out their interviews in a similar 
timeframe. Accordingly, the differences in the field-work period are not significant 
enough to merit further attention.   
Graph 2. Foreign-born population in the country (%) 
 
The result of Poland having a significantly more positive attitude towards immigration 
might be connected to the data in Graph 2 that shows the percentage of foreign-born 
population in the country. Poland has the lowest percentage of foreign-born population 
among all European countries under review in this study. Hence, it might seem that 
having a small number of foreign-born people in the country might result to a more 
positive attitude towards immigration. Nevertheless this assumption does not hold with 
all of the countries analysed here, since, for example, Czech Republic, having the least 
positive attitude towards immigration, has also the second smallest percentage of 
foreign-born population in the country. Switzerland and Sweden are ranked high in both 
of the graphs. And, as Table 1 shows, it is evident that the mean of foreign-born 
population in Eastern European countries (7.9%) is significantly lower than in Western 
European countries (13.9%). Thus, the question arises of whether the lower foreign-
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born population rates in Eastern European countries result in more negative attitudes 
towards immigration. A better explanation of the relationship between foreign-born 
population and attitudes towards immigration could be achieved using regression 
analysis. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for individual-level interval variables 
Variable 
Mean in 
Eastern 
Europe 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean in 
Western 
Europe 
Standard 
deviation 
Possibility to influence politics* 2.5 2.3 4.1 2.6 
Politicians care about your opinion* 2.5 2.2 3.9 2.4 
Government satisfaction* 3.8 2.3 4.6 2.3 
Education**  12.7 3.2 13.2 3.9 
Note 1: *measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is most negative answer and 10 most positive 
answer. **measured in years. 
Table 1 provides simple descriptive statistics for individual-level interval variables on 
political efficacy and education. The means of political efficacy variables are relatively 
low, with under 5 points averages on a 10 point scale (0 being the most negative answer 
and 10 being the most positive answer). The views in Eastern European countries are 
more negative than in their Western counterparts. For example, when asked whether 
respondents think that it is possible for them to influence politics, the average answer in 
Eastern Europe was 2.5 points on a 10 point scale, when at the same time the same 
question got a 4.1 point average in Western European countries. The most negative 
tendencies showed in Slovenia with an average for the same question only being 1.9 
points. The most positive proved to be Switzerland with a mean of 6.4 out of 10.  
The same tendencies showed for other efficacy variables as well with Eastern Europe 
having a lower mean and the most negative views belonging to an Eastern European 
country and most positive views belonging to a Western European country. The 
differences were somewhat smaller when respondents were asked about government 
performance and the satisfaction with it. Regarding that question the difference between 
the mean in Eastern and Western Europe was more narrow (3.8 in Eastern Europe and 
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4.6 in Western Europe). Nevertheless, the same countries were on the opposite sides of 
the scale – Slovenia having the most negative tendencies and Switzerland having the 
most positive view of their government. All in all, the differences between the East and 
the West, when it comes to political efficacy, are definitely visible and it needs to be 
explored further.  
The education variable shows only a slight disparity between the Eastern and Western 
European countries with the average years of schooling being 12.7 in the East and 13.2 
years in the West. The lowest education variable mean is in Switzerland with an average 
of 11.1 years of schooling. This is due to the reality that the majority of Swiss students 
opt for vocational training instead of college („Who Needs College?..“, 2012). The 
highest average of 14.2 years of schooling is found in Germany. Since both extremes 
are Western European countries, no underlining conclusions can be made on this 
question with current data.   
Another socioeconomic variable next to the education variable is the personal 
assessment of one’s economic situation which is an ordinal variable with answers of: 1 
– living comfortably, 2 – coping, 3 – finding it difficult and 4 – finding it very difficult. 
The results showed that 36% of the respondents are living comfortably and 46% of 
respondents are coping on present income. Only respectively 14% and 4% of 
respondents found it difficult or very difficult to manage on their present income. 
However, one’s personal economic assessment is slightly more negative in Eastern 
Europe, where 29% of respondents find it difficult or very difficult to cope compared to 
Western Europe where only 14% of respondents feel the same way.  
The religious belonging variable shows that 51.5% of the study’s respondents identify 
themselves with some religion or denomination and 48.5% do not. Most religious 
country is Poland with 90.2% of respondents saying that they can be identified with a 
religion or denomination and the least religious country is Czech Republic with 83.0 % 
of respondents saying that they do not identify themselves with a religion or 
denomination. Having Eastern European countries in the opposite ends of the 
distribution might make it difficult to find a specific pattern between the East and West 
but it might be possible to find a pattern in Europe in general.  
 15 
 
2.4 Results of regression analysis 
A correlation matrix including all independent variables suggests that none of the 
variables are highly correlated and therefore, there is no problem with multicollinearity 
and a regression analysis can be carried out. 
Robust linear regression is used instead of regular lineral regression to control for 
heteroskedasticity. The combined regression p-value of the model is 0,000 which means 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable 
(attitude towards immigration) and the independent variables. Separate regression 
models for Eastern and Western-European countries show the same significant 
relationship. R-square shows the amount of variance of dependent variable explained by 
independent variables. In the combined regression the independent variables explain 
16% of the variance in attitudes towards immigration. R-square in the Western-
European regression model shows that the the model explains 18% of the variance in 
attitudes towards immigration. However, R-square in the Eastern-European regression 
is significantly lower, having two times lower explaining power than the Western-
European regression with a R-square of 0.09. This could partly be explained by the fact 
that the respondent pool in Eastern Europe  (6140 respondents) is significantly smaller 
than the respondent pool in Western Europe (19.856 respondents). 
Moving to the specific independent variables and their relationships with the dependent 
variable, Table 1 shows that personal economic assessment has a moderate effect on 
one’s attitude towards immigration. Good economic situation has a positive effect 
which means that when very good economic assessment increases, attitude towards 
immigration becomes more positive. However, rating one’s economic situation difficult 
or very difficult has a stronger influence on person’s attitude towards immigration than 
rating it a positive one. When positive economic assessment only has a moderate 
statistical signifiance in Western Europe then a poor economic assessment is significant 
in both West and the East. When negative economic assessment rises, attitude towards 
immigration also becomes more negative. Overall, economic assessment has a moderate 
effect, but poor economic situation has a larger effect in both East and West and 
especially in the East. It is true that people who are anxious about their economic well-
being tend to be less trusting towards newcomers.  
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Table 1. Attitudes towards immigration in Eastern and Western European countries. 
Results of regression analysis.   
 Eastern Europe Western 
Europe 
Eastern and 
Western 
Europe 
combined 
Personal economic assessment: 
very good  
0.105 
(0.073) 
0.127*** 
(0.031) 
 
0.149***  
(0.029)    
Personal economic assessment: 
poor 
-0.263*** 
(0.064) 
-0.206*** 
(0.048) 
 
-0.215*** 
(0.038)   
Education (years) 0.068*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.097*** 
(0.004) 
 
0.155*** 
(0.008) 
0.093*** 
(0.004)    
 
0.131*** 
(0.007) 
 
Government satisfaction 0.094*** 
(0.014) 
 
Personal assessment: possibility 
to influence politics 
0.087*** 
(0.016) 
0.106*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.102*** 
(0.007) 
Personal assessment: politicians 
care about your opinion 
0.074*** 
(0.017) 
0.123*** 
(0.009) 
 
0.116*** 
(0.008) 
Belonging to a religion or 
denomination 
 
-0.709*** 
(0.055) 
 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
 
0.133*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.074** 
(0.025) 
Foreign-born population in the 
country 
 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Eastern-European country 
 
- - -0.165*** 
(0.035) 
 
Respondents in the model            6140 
 
         19856          25996 
 
R2 
 
0.09 
 
0.179 
 
 
0.161 
Constant 4.085 2.326 2.795 
The figures are OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parenthesis 
Sources: European Social Survey 2014-2015  
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
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The other socioeconomic measure, education, has a weak positive effect on person’s 
attitude towards immigration. That means that more years in school result in a more 
positive attitude towards immigration, but the effect of education on attitudes towards 
immigration is not strong. Also, compared to the East, education has a slightly larger 
effect in Western Europe. Combining the first two results it can be said that the 
hypothesis that stated that a higher socioeconomic status is associated with a more 
positive attitude towards immigration, is correct. However, positive economic 
assessment and more years in school affect Western European countries more than 
Eastern European countries.   
Political efficacy variables all have a slight positive effect on the dependent variable. 
The more person feels that the politicians care about their opinion, they have a chance to 
influence politics and that the government is doing a good job, the more positive he or 
she feels towards immigration. As two-tail p-values test shows, these results are also 
statistically significant. When comparing the results in Eastern and Western Europe, we 
see once again that the effect is stronger in Western Europe. Political efficacy does have 
a weak positive effect on attitudes towards immigration, but the effect is visibly larger 
in the West. Overall, the hypothesis of a higher sense of political efficacy resulting to a 
more positive attitude towards immigration is supported, but the correlation is yet again 
more important in Western Europe.  
The next result is an interesting one because it has a strong negative effect in Eastern 
Europe but a moderate positive one in Western Europe. For each one-point increase in 
the religion variable in Eastern-Europe, attitude towards immigration decreases by 
0,709 points. That means that people who belong to a religion or denomination in 
Eastern Europe, are highly more likely to have a more negative attitude towards 
immigration. Interestingly, the result in Western-Europe is a moderate positive one. 
Thus, religion variable has a different effect in the East and in the West. Belonging to a 
religion or denomination has a strong positive effect in Denmark (coef. 0.481), France 
(coef. 0.315) and Italy (coef. 0.634). Although, when looking at countries separately a 
couple of standalones can be noted. For example, the effect is also positive in two 
Eastern European countries – Poland (coef. 0.239) and Slovenia (coef. 0.104) – and 
some Western European countries like Switzerland (coef. -0.076) and Netherlands 
(coef. 0.027) have a weak negative effect. Only Western European country to stand out 
with a strong negative effect is Belgium with a regression coefficient of -0.341. The 
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paper predicted that individuals who belong to a particular religion or denomination are 
more likely to have a positive attitude towards immigration. The combined regression 
results prove this hypothesis to be false. However, the results vary between countries 
and regions. The results in Eastern Europe are strongly negative, while looking at 
Western European regression, we can see that the effect is a moderate positive one. 
There is a cleavage between the East and the West regarding this matter.  
Foreign-born population in the country has a weak effect both in the East and the West. 
However, the effect in Eastern Europe is a positive one and in Western Europe a 
negative one, meaning that having a larger foreign-born population in Western Europe 
results to a slightly more negative attitude towards immigration. Western Europe has a 
significantly higher rate of foreign-born population and that results in a negative effect 
between attitudes towards immigration and the percentage of foreign-born population in 
the country. Eastern Europe has a lower number of foreign-born population and its 
effect is a positive one. Although the effects are weak, the results appear to be in line 
with the group threat theory. Previously stated hypothesis that assumed that having a 
higher percentage of foreign-born population in the country is associated with a more 
positive attitude towards immigration has proven to be false. Notwithstanding, the 
results are not strong enough to draw firm conclusions. 
The last two hypotheses concern the differences and/or similarities in attitudes towards 
immigration in Eastern and Western European countries. The study proposed that 
people living in Western Europe have a more positive attitude towards immigration and 
that the individual-level predictors of attitudes towards immigration are the same in 
Eastern and Western Europe. Simple descriptive statistics showed that when comparing 
the means in Eastern and Western Europe the latter has somewhat more positive attitude 
towards immigration, as predicted. The mean in Western European countries is 5,3 
when in Eastern Europe it is 4,6 points out of 10. Regression analysis supports the same 
claim since belonging to an Eastern European country category has a moderate negative 
effect on the attitudes towards immigration. The regression coefficient shows that 
Eastern European group belonging has a regression coefficient of -0,165. The result is 
considerable, and, as two-tail p-values test shows, significant. Therefore the hypothesis 
of Western Europe having generally a more positive effect towards immigration is a 
correct one. 
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However, the other East vs West hypothesis is a more complicated one. It predicted that 
the individual-level predictors influence attitudes towards immigration in the same way 
both in East and the West. Economic assessment, education and political efficacy act 
the same way in both East and the West, but the effects are stronger in the West. But, 
more importantly, the religion variable has opposite results in the two regression 
models. When religion has an overall moderate positive effect in Western Europe then 
the effect in Eastern Europe is a strong negative one. All in all, the individual-level 
predictors chosen for this study do not act the same way in Eastern and Western Europe 
and therefore the hypothesis has to be rejected.  
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3. CONCLUSION 
More than a million migrants crossed into Europe in 2015, sparking a crisis as countries 
struggled to cope with the influx, and creating division in the EU over how best to deal 
with this crisis. The fact that immigration is a domain in which public opinion places 
significant constraints on public officials dictated the need to further examine the 
individual-level factors behind people’s viewpoints on immigration. The main purpose 
of this paper was to find out what the individual-level predictors that influence attitudes 
towards immigration in Europe are, how strong their effects are, and, moreover, to 
assess their effects comparatively in Eastern and Western Europe to see whether the 
assumption of the East of Europe having generally a more negative attitude towards 
immigration than the West of Europe, is a correct one. This aim was achieved by using 
quantitative research methods based on individual-level survey data from a large-n 
cross-national survey (ESS) and macro-level data from Eurostat. The data sample is 
large – consisting of the answers of up to 27,000 respondents with an average country 
sample of about 1800 respondents. 
The results show that three out of six hypotheses that were stated proved to be correct. 
First, the results strongly suggest that higher socioeconomic status is associated with a 
more positive attitude towards immigration. Better educated respondents face fewer 
socioeconomic risks and therefore have more positive expectations towards the future 
that result in a more tolerant attitude. It is possible that highly educated and 
economically secure people believe that cultural diversity benefits the host country. 
Also, people who are socioeconomically better off are likely to be less worried about 
competition on the labor market, which makes them more positive towards newcomers.  
The second hypothesis tested in this study stipulated a positive relationship between 
political efficacy and attitudes towards immigration. Regression results suggest that a 
higher sense of political efficacy and political trust are associated with a more positive 
attitude towards immigration. Those who trust their national political institutions and 
politicians are more tolerant towards immigrants. This could could be interpreted to 
mean that people who trust their institutions believe that these institutions can protect 
the population from the possible negative effects of  immigration.  
The empirical results of this study also confirm the expectation that people living in 
Western Europe have more positive attitudes towards immigration than people living in 
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Eastern Europe. These differences between the East and the West likely derive from the 
different compositions of immigrant populations, different historical backgrounds and 
varied political and economic developments in the East and the West. Many countries in  
Eastern Europe have only recently started to develop a political cleavage concerning 
immigration, while in Western Europe where these demographic changes have been 
taking place for almost half a century. 
The most pronounced difference in the regression results between the East and West 
derives from the religion variable. It was expected that people who are religious are 
more empathetic and understanding towards newcomers, but religion only had a 
moderate positive effect in Western Europe. However, its effect in the East is strong and 
negative which means that people who belong to a religion or denomination in Eastern 
Europe, are highly more likely to have a more negative attitude towards immigration. 
The effect of religion in the combined model – which includes both the East and the 
West – was also negative, meaning that religious people are more likely to perceive 
groups with other convictions as being threatening.  
Overall, the share of foreign-born population in a country has a weak negative effect on 
attitudes towards immigration in Europe. The effect in Eastern Europe is a positive one 
and in Western Europe a negative one. Thus, having a larger share of foreign-born 
population in Western Europe results in a slightly more negative attitude towards 
immigration. Although the effects are weak, the results appear to be in line with the 
group threat theory stating that a substantial minority population living close to the 
dominant group leads to economic and/or political threat and ultimately prejudice by the 
dominant group.  
Lastly, the evidence suggests that  not all individual-level predictors  influence attitudes 
towards immigration the same way in Eastern and Western Europe. Economic 
assessment, education and political efficacy act the same way in both East and the West, 
although all the effects are stronger in the West, which is partly due to the larger 
respondent pool. However, the religion variable proved to be a gamechanger. When 
religion has an overall moderate positive effect in Western Europe, its  effect in Eastern 
Europe is a strong negative one. This is something that stands out compared to other 
results and could be further explored in future studies.  
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All in all, socioeconomic situation, political efficacy, religious belonging and the 
percentage of foreign-born population in the country all have an effect on a person’s 
attitude towards immigration. People who feel politically capable and content are also 
more positive towards state-related affairs because they simply blame the government 
less. Therefore, in order to have a cooperative country population, governments need to 
include people more, make civil participation widely accessible and  have an open 
dialogue about these issues. It would also be helpful to put more emphasis on creating 
new jobs for the newcomers to minimise the struggle for the same resources. Because 
regarding the immigration matters there are a lot of hearsays, the government should do 
its best to explain the actual situation of the migrants and the benefits they recieve. 
Since religious belonging has the strongest effect of all the variables, it would be 
interesting to know what causes such strong negative result and whether a better 
connection with people from other religious groups would lower the perceived threats, 
or even further deepen the sense of threat. When comparing the overall results regarding 
attitudes towards immigration in the East and the West the results are as predicted – the 
West has a more positive attitude towards immigration. Eastern Europe has just recently 
started to develop policies concerning new immigration. Therefore it is understandable 
that it is problematic to come up with a united European voice regarding the migration 
crisis.  
This study provided a fresh set of results based on recent data. Testing our theoretical 
expectations against the latest data is important because the mindset of the society is 
always changing. The results will hopefully help build an empirical basis for a 
proactive, better informed immigration policy in Europe and provide ideas for future 
research. All in all, the study found that the attitudes in Eastern Europe are certainly 
more negative than the attitudes in the West. The flood of migrants and refugees, the 
largest movement of people Europe has seen since the end of Second World War, has 
raised doubt about open borders and provoked an argument over sharing the burden. 
More seriously, it has undermined stability and solidarity in the European Union. 
Eastern and Western Europe need to understand the public opinion in both of the 
regions, not only their own, in order to come to a compromise that is necessary to 
successfully tackle this ongoing crisis. 
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KOKKUVÕTE  
Suhtumine immigratsiooni ja seda mõjutavad indiviidi-tasandi tegurid Ida- ja 
Lääne-Euroopas 
Immigratsioon on hetkel Euroopas üks aktuaalsemaid ja vastuolulisemaid poliitilisi 
teemasid. Tulenevalt praegusest geopoliitilisest ja demograafilisest reaalsusest on 
migrantide sissevool Euroopasse pidevalt kasvanud. Rahvusvahelise 
Migratsiooniorganisatsiooni kohaselt saabus 2015. aastal Euroopasse üle miljoni 
migrandi, sh pagulase. See nähtus on süvendanud lõhet Ida- ja Lääne-Euroopa vahel. 
Ida-Euroopa erineb Lääne-Euroopast ajaloolise, poliitilise ja majandusliku tausta 
poolest ja see on põhjuseks, miks on Ida-Euroopas tegu võrdlemisi uue probleemiga. 
Sellest tulenevad vaidlused ning suutmatus ühisele arusaamisele jõuda, on tekitanud 
vaid lisapingeid.   
Kuna valitsused on poliitikate kujundamisel suuresti rahva arvamusest mõjutatud, on 
oluline aru saada, mis mõjutab immigratsiooni-teemalist avalikku arvamust. Seega ongi 
käesoleva töö eesmärk mõista, millised indiviidi-tasandi tegurid mõjutavad Euroopa 
elanike suhtumist immigratsiooni, milline on nende mõju, kas need tulemused on Ida- ja 
Lääne-Euroopas erinevad ning veelgi enam, kas Ida-Euroopas on inimeste suhtumine 
immigratsiooni üldiselt negatiivsem kui see on Lääne-Euroopas. Eesmärgi täitmiseks 
kasutati kvantitatiivseid meetodeid, mis põhinevad suurel indiviidi-tasandi Euroopa 
Sotsiaaluuringu valimil ja riigi-tasandi Eurostati andmetel. Esmalt viidi läbi regressioon 
kõikide riikide kohta ühiselt ning seejärel tulemuste võrdlemiseks ka Ida- ja Lääne-
Euroopa kohta individuaalselt.  
Töö algab teooria ning olemasoleva kirjanduse kirjeldusega, kus selgitatakse kolme 
indiviidi-tasandi tegurit: sotsiaalmajanduslikku tausta, poliitilist mõjusust ning 
religioosset kuuluvust. Lisaks neile indiviidi-tasandi teguritele peatutakse ka ühel riigi-
tasandi teguril, et mõista milline on välismaal sündinud populatsiooni mõju 
immigratsiooni suhtumisel riigis. Püstitatakse järgnevad hüpoteesid: 
H1. Kõrgema sotsiaalmajandusliku taustaga inimesed suhtuvad immigratsiooni 
positiivsemalt kui madalama sotsiaalmajandusliku taustaga inimesed. 
H2. Kõrgem poliitiline mõjusus on seotud positiivsema suhtumisega 
immigratsiooni. 
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H3. Inimesed, kes kuuluvad mõnda religiooni, on üldiselt positiivsema 
suhtumisega immigratsiooni kui inimesed, kes end kuhugi religiooni kuuluvaks 
ei pea.  
H4. Kõrgem protsent välismaal sündinud inimesi riigis on seotud positiivsema 
suhtumisega immigratsiooni.  
H5. Inimesed, kes elavad Lääne-Euroopas, suhtuvad immigratsiooni 
positiivsemalt kui inimesed, kes elavad Ida-Euroopas. 
H6. Indiviidi-tasandi tegurid, mis mõjutavad suhtumist immigratsiooni, on 
samad nii Ida- kui ka Lääne-Euroopas. 
Uurimistöö empiiriline osa peatub esmalt põgusalt kirjeldaval statistikal, kus selgub, et 
Ida-Euroopa riikides on suhtumine immigratsiooni keskmiselt madalam kui Lääne-
Euroopas. Järgneb regressioonianalüüs, kus joonistuvad välja suhted erinevate indiviidi-
tasandi tegurite ning immigratsiooni suhtumise vahel. Tulemused on järgnevad. 
Hüpotees 1 on tõene – kõrgema sotsiaalmajandusliku taustaga inimesed suhtuvad 
immigratsiooni positiivsemalt. Kusjuures on efekt suurem Lääne-Euroopas. Hüpotees 2 
leidis samuti kinnitust, tõestades, et inimesed, kes usaldavad oma valitsust ning 
tunnevad, et nad saavad poliitikat mõjutada, usaldavad valitsust ka immigratsiooni 
küsimustes. Hüpotees 3 ei leidnud tõestust, kuna religioosse kuuluvusega inimesed 
suhtuvad immigratsiooni negatiivsemalt. Eriti tugev ja statistiliselt oluline on see seos 
Ida-Euroopas kui samal ajal Lääne-Euroopas on tulemus vastupidine – kuuluvus 
religiooni on seotud veidi positiivsema suhtumisega immigratsiooni. Antud tulemus on 
regiooniti drastiliselt erinev. Hüpotees 4 ei leidnud samuti kinnitust, kuna selgub, et 
kõrgem välismaal sündinute arv riigis muudab ka suhtumise immigratsiooni veidi 
negatiivsemaks.  
Mis puudutab erinevusi Ida- ja Lääne-Euroopas, siis tulemused näitavad, et Ida-Euroopa 
riikide hulgas on negatiivne suhtumine immigratsiooni tugevam. Seega leidis hüpotees 
5 tõestust. Samas ei ole indiviidi-tasandi tegurite mõju kahes regioonis samasugune, mis 
tähendab, et hüpotees 6 ei leidnud kinnitust. Kuigi nii sotsiaalmajanduslik taust kui ka 
poliitiline mõjusus suurendavad nii Ida- kui ka Lääne-Euroopas tõenäosust, et indiviid 
suhtub immigratsiooni positiivselt, on religioonil kahes regioonis erinev mõju. Ida-
Euroopas suurendab religioosne kuuluvus tugevalt tõenäosust, et inimene suhtub ka 
immigratsiooni negatiivselt. Vastupidiselt sellele on religioonil Lääne-Euroopas 
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immigratsioonile kergelt positiivne mõju. See nähtus vajab kindlasti põhjalikumat 
uurimist.  
Käesolev migrantide vool on suurim, mida Euroopa on näinud alates Teisest 
Maailmasõjast ja see on tekitanud palju erimeelsusi üritades kokku leppida riikide rolli 
kriisi lahendamisel. Need erimeelsused on omakorda õõnestanud Euroopa üldist 
stabiilsust ja solidaarsust. Antud uurimistöö panus on seotud värskete tulemuste 
avaldamisega, kuna immigratsiooniga seotud tendentsid on ühiskonnas pidevalt 
muutumas ning uus info on hädavajalik. Lisaks annavad selle töö tulemused aluse 
edasisteks uurimistöödeks. Näiteks, miks on religioonil Ida-Euroopas niivõrd tugev 
negatiivne roll ning miks on kõrgem sotsiaalmajanduslik taust ja poliitiline mõjusus 
Lääne-Euroopas suurema kaaluga kui Ida-Euroopas. Mõlemad, nii Ida- kui ka Lääne-
Euroopa peavad mõistma avalikku arvamust ning selle erinevust regiooniti, et jõuda 
kompromissile, mis on vajalik, et kriis edukalt lahendada. 
 
 
